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FREEDOM OF RELIGION
AND THE STATE'
ORIO GIACCHI*

Introduction

I

WOULD LIKE TO BEGIN

my treatment of the subject of religious liberty

with a reference to an ancient text, the crude but picturesque language of which seems to express all the problems concerning the relation between the State and religious freedom.
The great King Nebuchadnezzar had three young Jews, Shadrack,
Mishak and Abednego, thrown into a fire, but the flames did not harm
them. Taken by surprise, impressed with the courage of the three young
men, and in terror of a God more powerful than the King, Nebuchadnezzar exclaimed: "Blessed be the God of Shadrack, Mishak and Abednego, He Who has sent His angel and freed His servants who, trusting
in Him, have disobeyed the king and have risked their lives rather
than serve or adore a God other than their own. I proclaim to all peoples
and nations that all those who speak disrespectfully of the God of
Shadrack, Mishak and Abednego be condemned and their homes
be destroyed."
In the first part of Nebuchadnezzar's brief statement, do we not
recognize the language of the Edict of Constantine which praised the
Christian heroes of the persecutions? Is there not also an obvious respect for courage such as that which inspired Napoleon to seek a
Concordat with Pius VII? On the other hand, does not the second
part of this discourse seem to suggest the undeniable oppression of
religious liberties under the Christian Roman Empire and, later, under
the Catholic princes of the Age of Absolutism?
With respect to the history of religious liberty it is necessary, above
all, to establish one essential fact. That is, there exist three different
ways of understanding the principle of religious liberty and, if one
confuses them, an understanding of the historical development of this
great concept becomes impossible.
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These three interpretations of religious liberty are as follows:
I. Religious liberty conceived as a
natural right of the human being to
search for and uncover the truth.
This natural right is to be accorded
respect, free from any temporal
power or authority that would seek
to force the individual to support
or accept a faith other than that
to which he has been led by an
exercise of his free will.
II. Religious liberty considered merely
as the right of a man to give public
or private expression to the doctrines of the one true religion, together with a tolerance for those
who in good faith remain outside
the truth simply because they have
never received it. There is also
tolerance with regard to heretics
and schismatics, when such is required by historical or local circumstances and, then, always within the limits of the common good.
III. Religious liberty understood as the
right of each man to think, believe,
pray and otherwise worship in the
belief that he has chosen, inasmuch
as there exists no truth, one and
immutable, or it is at least not
possible to derive, in the temporal
order, any consequence from its
existence.
It can be said that, in the first sense, religious liberty is understood ex parte subjecti and is considered a consequence of
the spiritual freedom of the individual.
Such an interpretation of religious liberty
rejects the intervention of any influence of
a temporal nature in the domain of the
spirit. It is in this sense that religious free-
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dom is understood by Christianity. This
interpretation has been given very explicit
and clear recognition, especially in the
encyclical Pacem in Terris. Furthermore,
it is a point that is definitely implicit in the
teachings of the Church.
In the second sense, the understanding
of religious freedom is directed strictly to
the object of thought and of the faith. It
is understood, above all, as freedom for
the truth. Thus it is that the exclusion of
force from the spiritual domain is, at least
in the first instance, merely the result of
the need for a voluntary adherence to the
thought and the faith wherein is reflected
the one truth. Furthermore, it is understood
that tolerance is accorded unbelievers for
this reason and by factors of an extrinsic
and contingent character, such as historical
and local circumstances.
The third interpretation of religious liberty is closely linked with a particular concept of religion and of thought, i.e., the
sceptical idea that either truth does not
exist or that it is unknowable; or that it
is at least not one, but rather composed of
several parts no one of which contains the
whole.
The history of religious freedom begins
with the affirmation of the principle as
understood in the first of the three senses
referred to above. In the Acts of the Apostles, the statements of the Fathers of the
Church during and after the persecutions,
and also in the Edict of Constantine, it has
always been declared necessary that man
obey God rather than other men. It has
been stated that this is the natural right of
a man quod putaverit colere that unusquique nulla servitatis necessitate adstrictus, integrum habeat vivendi arbitrium.
This correct understanding of the principle of religious freedom was courageously
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affirmed by the Church throughout the
first centuries and also after the persecutions. It has found an evident and direct
echo in Pacem in Terris, after having been
obscured since the time when St. Augustine verified the apparent efficacy of the
use of civil authorities against heretical
movements that destroy, along with the
faith, all moral principles, whether individual or social. With Augustine there
appeared a second and very different interpretation of religious liberty, based fundamentally on the concept of "freedom for
the truth," together with a regard for freedom in the act of faith, for the good faith
of those in error and for the exigencies of
the common good.
By means of certain theological doctrines that grew out of the development
of canon law, this limited recognition of
freedom for unbelievers was still more
strictly and rigorously interpreted during
the twelfth and thirteenth centuries. St.
Thomas Aquinas, at least in certain respects, reacted against this tendency toward
strict interpretation and repeated, with
particularly important consequences, the
reasons for tolerance toward those outside
the faith.
The Renaissance and the Protestant
Reformation did not bring any change to
the very strictly limited understanding of
religious liberty. What is more, Luther and
Calvin, in different ways, made their own
contributions to the already general climate
of persecution regarding those who did not
think and believe as did the majority of the
populace.
Among the numerous groups that were
born during the Reformation, or rather
from the consequences of the fracture and
separation that it had brought, there were
some who, far from defending a particular

faith considered to be the only truth, maintained, as had the decadent pagans, that the
mystery of invisible truth was so great
and so profound that no man could reveal
it nor could any earthly authority teach it.
These were the Anabaptists, the Socinians,
and the Arminians.
It was only natural that, having these
convictions, these groups would ask for and
proclaim freedom for all religions. Some of
these groups, somewhat incoherently,
limited this propagation of religious liberty
to Christian cults. To these affirmations of
religious liberty have been attributed, to a
large extent, the credit for having first announced the great principle of religious
freedom. However, it is not difficult to see
that these statements were the logical result of a particular opinion (i.e., that truth
was not one), rather than a broad affirmation of the individual's natural right to
pursue the truth freely.
In addition to the syncretic movements
mentioned above, the principle of religious
liberty was broadly asserted by the English
liberals and by the revolutionary movement in the American colonies. For English Liberalism, beginning with John
Locke, religious freedom was merely the
result of the separation of the State from
religion and the consequent indifferentism
of the State with respect to spiritual
matters. In the New World, on the other
hand, the principle was understood more
in relation to the liberty of the individual
and the natural rights of the human being,
without postulating in any way the impossibility of absolute truth or the indifference of the State with respect to it.
In this sense, the most concrete declaration of the principle of religious liberty
was that formulated by the first CatholicAmerican colony, Maryland, in its Act of
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Tolerance, dated April 21, 1649. In a similar vein were the various declarations of
rights later incorporated in the constitutions of states such as Virginia, Pennsylvania, North Carolina, Massachusetts, and
New Hampshire.
During the same period there appeared
in Europe, largely through the influence of
the Dutch and German naturalists, a doctrine of religious freedom that underlined
the fact that religious dissidence should not
be considered a crime; that it is not a defect of the will, but rather an exercise of
spiritual freedom. Furthermore, these naturalists underscored the dependence of the
principle of religious liberty on the impossibility of judging what the truth is, considering the multiplicity of means of approaching the gran secretum. Thus was extended the third understanding of religious
freedom which, as we have seen, was
founded on the concepts of scepticism and
syncretism.
It was possible to conclude from the
events of the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries that the primary and true meaning of religious liberty was that which arose
from an appreciation of the right of a human being to pursue the truth in freedom.
As thus understood, the principle found its
true expression only in the American colonies, although even there it was subject to
some restrictions. In continental Europe,
the absolutist State applied, with some
notable, if qualified, exceptions, the principle of liberty for the truth alone, together
with a relative tolerance with respect to
dissidents and unbelievers. Meanwhile, the
concept of religious liberty was also promulgated in Europe by a secularist and
juridical doctrine that followed, almost
exclusively, a syncretist and sceptic notion
of truth.
Everyone knows that a State arose from
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the French Revolution, a State which,
while announcing itself totally agnostic
concerning religious matters, was nevertheless unable to declare an absolute freedom of religion. During the short period of
the Restoration, religious liberty was
strictly limited by the confesionismo of the
State, considered to be the principal protector and authority of the official religion.
The subsequent installation of a "liberal"
State carried with it the affirmation of a
religious freedom that, while considered as
the "equality of religions," was, in practical
effect, principally an attack against the
Catholic Church. Understood thus as the
"equality of religions," the principle of religious liberty was used to justify a struggle against the institutions and activities of
the Church, a battle provoked by the "secular" State. The idea of religious freedom,
understood as a consequence of the impossibility of recognizing truth thus revealed
all the profound confusion and danger that
was hidden in the fundamental error from
which it was born. Understood in this perverted sense, religious liberty was converted into an enemy of the Catholic faith
of the majority of the citizenry.
Since the first decades of this century,
the true and essentially Catholic notion of
religious freedom, as the natural right of
the human person, has been constantly
proclaimed by ardently Catholic men, such
as Charles de Montalembert. However, the
lack of precision in the exposition of their
point of view, and the obvious danger of
confusing it with certain "secular" ideas,
induced a large part of Catholicism to become intransigent or even aggressively opposed to their ideas, although the future in
fact rests in their point of view. This can
be demonstrated by the undeniable fact
that their essentially Catholic point of
view received important recognition in the
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great encyclicals of Leo XIII, although
subject to some prudent limitations and
reservations imposed by the historical atmosphere which was still permeated with
the "confessional" ideas of the absolutist
State.
The undeniable and clear affirmation of
the principle of religious liberty, understood as freedom for the human being, is
of very recent history. It was manifested in
some basic texts of Pius XI and Pius XII,
and it is revealed in all its clarity in the
proclamation of the encyclical Pacem in
Terris. This concept of religious liberty has
now penetrated all levels of today's Catholicism, notwithstanding certain exceptions
due, principally, to the confusion of this
true meaning of religious liberty with that
which is propagated by the "secularists."
The State and Religious Liberty
The important subject of religious liberty
has frequently been discussed as essentially
the problem of convincing by reason or
imposing by law, particularly but not exclusively on the Catholic Church, the abandonment of the use of coercive influence or
material sanctions against the property of
those who are in conflict with the Church.
It is undeniably true that part of the
responsibility for the painful history of religious freedom belongs to the Catholic
Church, and perhaps to an even greater extent rests with certain Protestant and schismatic ecclesiastical communities. However,
the actual problem, that which affects most
deeply the very possibility of freedom of
belief and worship, concerns the emergence
of that liberty within a social and political
order occupied by individuals and communities who maintain a creed that is distinct from that which is followed by those
in power.
It is precisely at this point that we enter

upon the great debate concerning the social
transformations to which our age has given
birth or is giving birth. These transformations have to do with the concept of the
State and its practical activity, in relation
to individuals and in relation to other social communities. These latter organizations may be either subject to the State,
equal to it, or in a certain sense superior to
it (encompassing a higher order of things).
With respect to this important subject,
I believe that we will have to first eliminate
from our discussion an opinion which,
while widespread and in conformity with
certain superficial appearances of today's
world, expresses nothing new and is certainly not completely true. I refer to the
opinion that all the problems concerning
the relations between the State and religious faith, and consequently, the two immense subjects of the relation between the
State and religion and freedom of religion,
ought to be discussed in terms of what
would be considered the most decisive historical fact of our time, i.e., the end of the
Constantine era. The latter is understood
to signify: (1) the estrangement of religion
and all things sacred from every aspect of
social living, (2) the declared and absolute
autonomy of the State with regard to any
religious or moral norm, (3) the perhaps
still more significant open and militant consolidation of atheism, and finally (4) the
tendency of political forces toward an activity dictated solely by considerations of a
utilitarian, economic and administrative
nature. In short, the problem is understood
as the total absorption of contemporary
society in the secular and temporal sphere,
to the extent that religion finds itself
necessarily reduced to a merely individual
or interior value.
It is obvious that if this were in fact the
situation, not only the attitude of the
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Church with respect to the State, but also
the problem of religious freedom itself
would have to be considered strictly in
terms of this so-called new reality. The situation would have to be discussed in the
language of the strictest partisans of separatist liberalism, that which acknowledges
the agnosticism of the State and is termed
"negative secularism."
However, I believe that we are dealing
with a totally erroneous understanding of
present conditions which, in reality, confront us with some very different and opposing characteristics. We are in fact witnessing today a crisis of the myths of the
"modern age," or the "end of modern
times" as it is often called. The modem
age grew out of the Renaissance and wears
the special insignia of that great and fruitful epoch: (1) individualism, understood
as the objective and essential superiority of
a particular class of men (the cultured, the
"elite") with respect to the uneducated and
barbarous masses, and (2) intellectualism,
according to which the object of all activity is the transformation of the present into
a new reality dominated by a rational
scheme. If we reflect upon this fact, we
will realize that, from the fifteenth century
to the two world wars, western civilization
was dominated by these concepts. Naturally, they did not manifest themselves
solely in the political order, but rather,
were reflected in all aspects of living, such
as the area of economics. (We may well ask
ourselves if there is really any difference between the condottiere of the Renaissance
who made himself an absolute ruler, and
the industrial magnate of the eighteenth
century who established himself in economic primacy through his own efforts and
by virtue of whatever means were at his
disposal.) These ideas also found expres-
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sion in literature, in the dreams of the anarchists and in the elite forces of Fascism.
However, for the most part, these ideas
disappeared with the decline of the society
to which they were completely bound-a
society that had remained basically one
under two very different exterior aspects.
It was, in reality, the same society that pertained during the Age of Absolutism (especially in its second phase) and during the
era of radical democracy (or individual
liberalism). These epochs were dominated
by the superior individual, either in the
form of a prince, demagogue or industrial
giant. When these individuals were in a
superior position, as guides and artisans
of a community's destiny, they considered
it their duty to transform the world, more
or less radically, in order to effectuate their
purposes. The particular object to be
achieved naturally depended on a number
of interests, not to mention those of the
elite. However, above all, these men were
inspired by a rational scheme, a model of
perfection which they considered it their
obligation to imitate, and to realize in fact
as soon as possible.
The great socialist or universalist movements of workers and peasants during the
past century brought this society to a critical point. It has since been seriously affected by two fundamental facts of twentieth century life: (a) universal suffrage,
and (b) the ever-increasing involvement
of the State in the social affairs of the
community. A third and most important
factor in the disintegration of the old society appeared principally after the Second
World War. I refer to the undeniable necessity for a more or less profound union
with other communities of States and also
with a world organization of States.
With the advent of universal suffrage,
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the difference between superior individuals and the masses, based on intelligence,
education and ambition, began to lose its
practical effect. With the involvement of
the State in the complexities of daily living, a rationalization of the organization
of the State became more and more difficult. With the necessity for ties with other
States and with an international community
of States, the individualism of the State
either disappeared or was seriously weakened. It was precisely this individualismo
de Estado that had ensouled the organization of the Western State and had created the policy of imperialism. It was also
the concept that vivified the awesome economic phenomena which, juridically regulated largely according to Roman Law, developed after the Industrial Revolution.
With regard to this regime, the questions
we will ask are: what had been the position of religion in this State and what was
the situation of the dominant faith? Furthermore, what religious freedom existed,
if any, for those individuals and communities that did not adhere to the dominant
faith?
On this subject, there was, of course, a
tremendous difference between the absolutist States and those which were common
to almost all of liberal Europe. However,
it is also important to realize that the very
different regimes formed during the tragic
years of the French Revolution, and during the reformation which was attempted
by the Restoration reflected the same ideas
of individualism and intellectualism which,
as we have said, characterized the entire
modern age. Thus, whether confronted with
the dominant religious faith or the dominant political ideology, the position of the
State was the same, viz., that of one who
had adopted a particular opinion, faith or

belief and had afterwards had the power to
impose it on others not merely as the
source of its vitality or principal interpreter of its content, but also as the instrument of its general promulgation in the
community, such that those governed became more or less thoroughly imbued with
it.
If we look a little beyond external appear-.nces, we will realize that the State of
the late fifteenth century, that which would
a little later be transformed into an absolute State was that State which elected a
belief of which the ruler afterwards proclaimed himself defender and protector.
The struggles that followed the Protestant
Revolution not only broke the unity of the
faith, but also brought individualism into
a European society torn apart by religious
wars. This individualism was actually a
new unity, based on religion, but also a
product of the State itself. This new religious unity was strictly attached to a particular political structure and, from a human point of view, it had no universality.
The authorities of the Catholic Church,
the only remaining authority that could, at
least in theory, maintain a complete autonomy and continue to affirm a potestas indirecta in temporalibus,were not able to provide a really effective limit on the authority
of the State. This was not because such
would be considered outside the Church's
proper field of action, nor would the State
consider itself indifferent to the Church's
spiritual power, but rather, for the opposite
reason. That is, the State had become
"confessional," it had autonomously chosen
its own religion or confession, and the civil
effect of the spiritual powers of the ecclesiastical authorities depended upon this
choice alone. The names taken by the various Protestant and Catholic rulers of the

11
late sixteenth century, such as "Defender
of the Faith," "Very Christian King," and
"Apostolic Majesty," were an external and
formal sign of this situation. The Sovereign
had thus become religiously ungovernable.
He was the most worthy foundation of the
faith and was the person in whom the religion of the entire community was summarized.
When the structure of Absolutism was
destroyed by the Revolution of 1789, the
State that was born bore the stamp of Napoleonic organization as well as, in its way,
the mark of the "confessional" State. This
was true because this State had still another
credo, another faith chosen exclusively by
the powerful elite, i.e., the liberal ideology.
It was undeniable that the principle of religious liberty was a part of this ideology,
in fact, it was an essential element of it.
But, in what sense was religious liberty
understood? It was understood exactly in
the sense that transformed it into an ingredient of the new "secular confessionality"
and thus rendered it compatible with the
discrimination for "religious"
reasons
which had been a basic element of the concept of the confessional State of the absolutist regime.
For the new liberal State, the proclamation of religious liberty was principally an
affirmation of the superiority of the State
over any faith that claimed to transcend
its "secularism." This resulted from the
fact that at the pinnacle of human society
(in all its aspects) there was an absolute
and untouchable sovereign, one who recognized no other authority, even in the spiritual domain.
Religious freedom, understood as a projection of the sovereignty of the State, resolved itself into the "equality of cults,"
since the State regarded as insignificant any
differences it had not created. In the pres-
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ence of the enormous reality of the Catholic Church, religious liberty, as thus interpreted, could never have resulted in a
struggle with the latter unless there did not
in fact exist, as in the United States, a concept of the State distinct and far removed
from that of the Renaissance and the epoch
we have discussed above. In the United
States, the Church prospered from a universal right of religious freedom which was
never deformed at the expense of the
Church. However, in Europe, a series of
laws appealing to religious liberty attacked
exactly that religious freedom which was
under the circumstances most importantCatholic liberty.
We must not allow these bitter memories to cause us to regard the temporal
powers with clerical or partisan sentiments.
There is no one as convinced as we that
divine providence undoubtedly utilized
these oppressive laws and this hostile atmosphere as both a cause and effect of the
purification and strengthening of the
Church. In any case, as we have said before, it is necessary to consider this aspect
of the development of religious liberty because it helps to explain, at least in part,
the condemnations of it promulgated by the
ecclesiastical authorities during the past century and until the pontificate of Leo XIII.
The problem of the position of the
State with regard to religious liberty takes
on different characteristics as a result of
the crisis in the concept of the liberal or
"secular" State, i.e., the invasion of Europe
by universal suffrage, the increasing involvement of the State in daily affairs, and
the alteration of the idea of absolute sovereignty brought on by the need for
broader communities of States and for
some sort of world order.
During this period, and precisely at the
close of the Second World War, the State
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became for the first time democratic, in the
sense that the masses began to form a true
part of it. Largely as a result of universal
suffrage, the people were becoming rulers,
potentially at least, if not in fact. The ruling class was thus extended to the point
that it lost all concrete form. He who directly governed the State was forced to
consider the will of the people. This popular will, although poorly represented, confused and vague, was nevertheless an actual fact. The application of a rational
scheme to a given problem was almost impossible if attempted independently of the
sentiments of the people, and apart from
those deep currents that had been running
for centuries through their spiritual life.
The obligations of the State became numerous and difficult and the machinery of the
State displayed an inability to perform
complex and various obligations which ran
from industrial economics to high finance,
from social welfare to professional planning, and from the conciliation of labor
disputes to the governing of urban areas.
Since the fact was finally established that
no State could live in simple autonomy and
completely independent, the concept of the
State began to broaden. The fact that the
State was in need of association with larger
communities of States and thus shared an
international responsibility, forced a reconsideration of that unique concept of
the State as an absolute sovereign, incapable of accepting any rule unless it be the
source of such regulation; the complete
imminence of all authority.
In place of this concept of the "secular"
State, utterly aloof and autonomous, in
place of this abstract fetish (born from the
dual influence on European philosophy of
idealism and positivism, which encouraged
man to regard himself as superior to all
mystery and in possession of all spiritual

power), there began to appear concrete
traces of a new State. This new State was
nourished by the ideals and desires of the
masses. It was a State that was aware,
through daily experience, of the great limitations imposed upon it by its obligations.
It was a member of a community of States,
a fact that could not but limit its absolute
and exclusive autonomy, and broaden its
vision in all areas, not merely in the political sphere but also in the realm of sociology and culture.
Ultimately, this new State was, therefore, the negation of the "secular" State.
In its new situation, the State constituted
the expression and formal organization of
the aspirations, sentiments and traditions
of all the people. How could this popular
State hold itself aloof from responsibility
to God and from respect for the moral law
which was present in the soul of the people? The simple and abstract concept that
the State could concern itself only with
ends, with goals to be achieved-that this
was its only law-had no efficacy when
confronted with the great movements of
popular opinion. Such an idea had relative
validity only in a State ruled from behind
closed doors by a restricted number of individuals. Whether in good faith or hypocritically, the rulers of the new State were
forced to educate popular opinion through
the presentation of moral arguments and
from the invocation of religious principles
taken from religious tradition, as well as
from the utilization of generous, spirituallyinspired motives.
It was certain that the new State had to
concern itself with the structure and functions of society. Primarily, it was faced with
the problems presented by the social economy. In other words, it was forced to consider and attempt to solve the problem of
social justice, i.e., the equitable distribution
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of the wealth of the society, an equal distribution of its burdens, the betterment of
the lower classes and the poorer geographical regions, the curing of those who were
ill and the repair of that which was deteriorated or disordered in society.
These arduous tasks, which involved the
State in enormous difficulties, were imposed on the State by laws that originated
beyond its borders, in the name of justice
and honor, rather than utility. This made
the State the servant of the human being
and of ideals that had their roots in the
spirituality and dignity of man.
We will have a complete picture of this
new State, so very different from that
which appeared on the world scene just a
few decades ago, when we add that its obligations, beginning with that of religious
liberty, were to a great extent confirmed in
the Universal Declaration of the Rights of
Man, approved by the General Assembly
of the United Nations on December 10,
1948.
There exists within this new State a
wide variety of other social organizations
with a definite and valuable function in the
society. These are, for example, the political parties and labor unions, the private
monopolies and public economic structures, the completely private organizations
and the government itself. The relation between the State and -the individual is necessarily altered by the presence of these
new social entities. The former relation
had been principally formal and abstract.
It left the individual completely alone in
his confrontation with the State (an absolute sovereign), to such an extent that the
rights of the individual were considered as
"created" rather than recognized by the
State. These new and very diverse organizations limit the State in this area, while
they infuse strength and vitality into it.
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Within this new political order, the most
powerful defense of individual rights, the
product of the profound social changes
of our time, rests most securely on principles that are "extra-estatales" or "preestatles," i.e., on a foundation of ethical
and religious standards derived from without or above the State and imposed on the
latter by virtue of their own power. Their
independence is guaranteed by their source,
even though they may be incorporated into
the juridical order by a free act of selflimitation on the part of the State. These
are the standards that will govern the play
of forces within the social structure.
Among the individual rights that are
thus protected, freedom of religion takes a
place that is of primary and essential importance. If we wish to examine a recent
constitution, for example, the Italian Constitution, we will see that religious liberty
is recognized, in various ways and for different purposes.
Art. 3: All citizens enjoy the same social dignity and are equal before the law,
without distinction as to sex, race, language,
religion, political opinions, or social position. It is the obligation of the Republic to
overcome the economic and social obstacles
that, limiting the liberty and equality of
citizens, impede the complete development
of the human personality and the effective
participation of all those who work in the
political, economic and social structure of
the country.
Art. 19: Everyone has the right to freely
profess his own religious faith in any form,
individually or in association with others; to
preach it and worship in it, publicly or
privately, limited only by an attention and
adherence to lawful conduct (las buenas
costumbres).

Art. 20: The ecclesiastical characteristics
and purposes of a religious association or
institution can not be a basis for either spe-
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cial legislative limitations or special taxes
directed at its particular constitution, legal
status, or activity in whatever form.
Art. 7: The State and the Catholic Church
are, each in its own order, independent and
sovereign. Their relations are governed by
the Lateran Pacts. Modifications of these
Treaties, accepted by both parties, do not
require any constitutional amendment.
Art. 8: All religious confessions are equally
free before the law. Religious faiths other
than Catholic have the right to organize
themselves according to their own laws, so
long as these are in conformity with the
Italian law. Their relations with the State
are governed, as of right, by agreements
signed with their corresponding representatives.
The first three articles quoted affirm:
(a) the equality of all citizens before the
law, whatever their religion; (b) the freedom of any citizen to profess his religious
faith under any form, to worship in it and
to propagate it; and (c) the exclusion of
any limitations or special burdens based on
the ecclesiastical organization or purpose of
a religious association or institution.
Articles 7 and 8, which seem to refer to
the principle of religious liberty less directly, should, on the contrary, be regarded
as a coherent affirmation of this principle,
examined in its essential meaning and historical context. Article 7 confirms the independence of the Church in its order, that
is to say, the spiritual realm. Article 8 states
that all religious beliefs are equally free
before the law, and adds that all nonCatholic faiths have the right to organize
themselves according to their own rules,
limited only by the requirements of the
Italian juridical system. Furthermore, their
relations with the State are "based on
agreements," although such are interpreted
according to unilaterally enacted legislation.

From a juridical and spiritual point of
view, these norms of the Italian Constitution are not to be confused with the statements on religious liberty that have been
incorporated in certain other constitutions.
As found in the Italian Constitution, the
formulas we have quoted are dictated
neither by a "secular" concept of the State,
nor by a sceptic struggle with religions
considered oppressive by an individual who
finally finds the road open to "free-thinking."
This fact is demonstrated very clearly,
not only by the basic norm laid down in
Article 7-the recognition of the sovereign
autonomy of the Catholic Church in its
order-but also by Article 8, which locates
the non-Catholic confessions on a level
distinct from and superior to all other communities and organizations subject to the
Italian State. However, it would be absurd
to discuss the relation of the Italian State
to religious freedom without a somewhat
more prolonged attention to Article 20. The
latter states that the ecclesiastical or religious character of an association or institution cannot be sufficient reason for unfavorable dispositions with respect to it.
The "secular" State, liberal only in name,
maintained the equality of all beliefs as a
premise, and prided itself on having first
enunciated the great principle of religious
liberty. However, as the principal weapon
in its anti-ecclesiastical struggle, the "secular" State managed the suppression of the
juridical personality of religious institutions
and ecclesiastical-secular associations, while
pressuring them out of existence principally
by means of special taxes and patrimonial
conversions. Taking this into account, we
can readily see that the consideration of
the whole problem of religious liberty with
respect to the new State is something quite
different.
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To continue to linger with satisfaction
on the prudent characteristics of the Italian
system of relations between the State and
religious faiths and, consequently, between
the State and religious liberty, would in no
sense exhaust our subject. In the first place,
things are always in flux and it is therefore
never safe to rely completely on the protection of written regulations. Above all,
this is because there exists today, in numerous states, a situation very different from
that which pertains in Italy.
I refer not only to those states dominated
by Communism, states which are very far
removed from the recognition of religious
liberty, although some of these have written
this principle into constitutions that, on this
subject and others, have no real obligatory
effect. Rather, I refer also to the many new
states (born principally in Africa) which,
while recognizing the principle of religious
freedom in its general and abstract form,
offer no guarantee that is really respected.
Among other things, this is because they
are almost all one-party countries or at
least governed under a "directed democracy." They are political entities in which
there is no general recognition of freedom,
due either to the necessities imposed by
their perhaps uncertain political structure,
or to the lack of indigenous political traditions. It is natural, therefore, that they do
not effectively maintain the principle of
religious freedom.
We witness in today's world an application of methods that seemed to have been
definitively abandoned. To begin with, we
are confronted, in the Communist countries, with a continuation of the violent
and fraudulent oppression of all religion,
beginning with the Christian faiths. This
remains true, even though there is some
cause for hope in Poland, Hungary and
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Czechoslovakia, countries in which Catholicism has always been most active and
closely in contact with the people. However, as we have indicated, in other nonCommunist and openly anti-Communist
countries, the position of the Catholic
Church and of positive Christianity in general is gravely compromised, precisely on
the fundamental issue of religious liberty.
This situation is the result of historical hatred for Christian missionaries who did not
always know how to clearly distinguish
their position with respect to the states
which had colonized these areas. It is also
the product of racial and nationalist sentiments concerned with nothing more than
the resurrection of ancient civilizations.
Thus, the real problem of religious liberty
must be understood in a living historical
context, rather than in simple juridical
formulas.
As we said at the beginning, the problem
has long since ceased to consist in simply
convincing the Catholic Church or other
Christian religious communities that they
should abandon the principle that only the
truth can be free. The Church has always
excluded the use of force from her teaching
on the subject of conversion, insisting that
it be an interior act of the will. This is true
even though, in the course of history, the
Church has not always been able to prevent the use of violence inflicted in the
name of religion. Since the Pontificate of
Leo XIII, she has even more clearly stated
her position with regard to religious liberty.
In so doing, the Church has placed this
great principle on its surest foundationthe concept of man as a spiritual being
who has the primary right to the pursuit
of truth and the corresponding right to
travel the road to it freely.
As thus interpreted, as a right derived
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from the nature of man as a spiritual
being, inviolable in his interior, freedom
for the truth can in no way be made to
exclude liberty in general and, consequently,
freedom for error. Of course, if the road
to truth proves somewhat difficult, the
Church should be free to offer its loving
admonitions and lucid explanations. Coercive force, however, can never be allowed
to be a substitute for free persuasion in that
which concerns man's spiritual nature, for
if such force were to be applied, it would
be employed by that which possesses coercive means, i.e., temporal society. What is
more, it would constitute an affirmation of
the primacy of force, and therefore matter,
with respect to the spirit.
Since the Catholic Church freed herself
from too close a union with the State, and
since the separated Churches, in actual
fact, abandoned their status as "state religions," they have resolved the problem of
religious liberty by anchoring themselves
in this basic understanding of the principle
of religious liberty. Today, the problem
concerns the relationship of the State to
the freedom of religion. As I have tried to
explain, the contemporary State no longer
places itself on a level of intellectual superiority with regard to the "unformed"
masses. It no longer considers itself superior to and removed from the religious
faiths, nor is it totally indifferent to and
beyond the jurisdiction of moral and religious norms. On the contrary, having lost
the status of a "secular" State, "secularism"
being understood to signify complete independence from all external regulation, the
contemporary State has ideologically assumed certain vital concepts that can, with
regard to religious liberty, place it in a
position equally or perhaps more dangerous
than that which it occupied in the past.

I refer to (a) the desire to realize complete social justice by any means available,
including those most violent and oppressive, (b) the will to identify itself with the
racial, linguistic and mythical traditions of
the people, and (c) the tendency to sacrifice every consideration to the formation of
a new popular community. Surrounded by
enemies, and in a constant struggle, these
are the elements of the new State that can
and actually do induce many states to sacrifice or considerably limit all liberty, beginning or ending with freedom of religion.
Confronted with this awesome and undeniable situation, it is superficial and false
for the nations who are faithful to the concept of freedom to resort to a sterile condemnation of the violation of this great
principle or to attempt a moral boycott of
sorts. None of these methods could change
the direction of the path which the ardent
and, above all, irreplaceable leaders of
these communities have traced.
As a matter of fact, in this political situation that is so full of potential for good
and evil, only one power can come to the
defense, not only of religious freedom, but
of freedom in general. This is the power
of the Church, above all the Catholic
Church, which sometime in the future, and
by means as yet unknown to us, will bring
about the unification of all the Christian
Churches. The Catholic Church is both a
spiritual and an earthly entity. Deeply anchored in the people, it teaches principles
of love and justice for all, principles which
constitute the most valid and substantial
substrate of the contemporary State. Furthermore, the Church is spread throughout
the world and, consequently, is present in
the international order to which the contemporary State must be securely anchored.
This State should by all means seek an ac-
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cord with this flourishing and insuppressible Church, a harmony whose first and
essential note could not be other than freedom for the Church itself.
We can be sure that this would seem
a supreme paradox to men of the past, and
to those who live by the ideas of the pastthat the best defense of freedom is an accord between the Catholic Church and the
State, the first principle of which is a recognition of the Church as an entity endowed with a sovereignty derived from its
own spiritual domain. It should be noted,
however, that this theory constitutes one of
the profound, if subtle, reasons for the unjustifiably maligned efforts of Pope John
XXIII in connection with the religious
situation in Russia and the Soviet satellites, including the problem of the Russian
Orthodox Church. If in fact an agreement
were to be reached tomorrow with these
countries, Russia in particular, the primary
advantage of such a presently improbable
accord, religious freedom, would be recognized not only on paper but in the fact of
the Russian Orthodox Church. The latter,
through the efforts of the Church of Rome,
would achieve an indispensable means toward a more intense life of its own-an
actual opportunity for the reconquest of
souls. The possible consequences are incalculable, not only regarding a rebirth of
Christianity among the people who are restored -to it, but also for the prospects of a
reunion with the largest separated Christian Church.
As we have seen, there are countries in
which freedom in general is rarely practiced or where it has been given a totally
distinct interpretation, such as "functional
liberty," "popular freedom," or "controlled
liberty," instances in which the adjective
destroys the noun. If, in such countries,
freedom of religion can scarcely be pre-
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served by means of an accord between
these states and the Catholic Church, what
is happening today in those countries having a liberal and democratic tradition?
During this last century, a new factor
has manifested itself in these states. By
means of masses of Catholic voters (in
some respects very different from the laity
of the past), universal suffrage, extended
in almost all countries to include women,
has returned political power to the Church.
At least since the Renaissance, and including the major part of its prior history, the
Church has dealt solely with princes and
their ministers, or with the small ruling
classes of the liberal society of the eighteenth century. It now finds itself faced
with the representatives of a people who
are in large measure its own followers.
Caesar wears a new face but, underneath,
the traits of fidelity to the Church are obvious, at least in numerous European countries and their former colonies. They are
particularly significant if we stop to consider that the Catholic Church is the only
religious society that affirms a sovereignty
originating from within its own domain
and which occupies a position of independence that is recognized even in international law.
The danger to freedom of religion is obvious in states hostile to the recognition of
liberty for their citizens. We wonder, however, if the situation in democratic countries is not even more fraught with dangers
to religious freedom. Viewed from a purely
mundane and external position, given the
situation of the Catholic Church in some
of these states, is there not some danger
that religious liberty might come to be regarded in a more or less restricted sense,
as perhaps "the liberty of the Church," for(Continued on page 346)

